ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Of the many challenges in engineering design, among the greatest are accounting for uncertainty and reducing associated risks. Engineers have developed or adopted various methods to support design decision-making under uncertainty and to mitigate risk, such as safety factors [1] , utility theory [2] [3] [4] [5] , robust design [6, 7] , reliability based design optimization [8] [9] [10] [11] , and probabilistic risk assessments [12, 13] . The risk that results from uncertainty has three main componentswhat can go wrong, how likely it is, and what its consequences are [13] , with risk defined as the probability of a scenario times the consequences associated with that scenario. In this paper, we focus on quantification of probabilities. We believe that current methods are still limited in their ability to clearly and quantitatively reflect the uncertainty encountered in engineering design because they do not adequately accommodate imprecise characterizations of uncertainty.
Imprecision can result from fundamental indeterminacy in the available evidence or from incomplete characterizations of the available evidence and designer beliefs, as discussed subsequently in this paper. Common practice, such as in expected utility maximization, is to ignore this imprecision and to represent uncertainty using precise probabilities. Our hypothesis is that, in engineering design decisions, it is valuable to explicitly represent the imprecision in the available characterization of uncertainties by using imprecise probabilities (e.g. intervals of probabilities).
In the context of decision theory and utility theory, one design method is preferred to another if on average it yields designs with higher expected utilities. In this paper, we use a pressure vessel design example and computational experiment that demonstrate the value of a design method that uses imprecise probabilities to characterize uncertainty, in comparison to a method that uses precise probabilities. Aughenbaugh
UNCERTAINTY IN ENGINEERING DESIGN

Definitions of uncertainty
We view uncertainty in the context of decision theory, and following Nikolaidis [14] , we define uncertainty indirectly from the definition of certainty. Nikolaidis defines certainty as the condition of knowing everything necessary to choose the course of action whose outcome is most preferred. We define a decision-maker's uncertainty as the gap, shown in Figure 1(a) , between certainty and the decision-maker's present state of information-the information the decision-maker currently has available for decision-making, which is a slight refinement of Nikolaidis's definition. Note that the relative sizes of components in Figure 1 have no real meaning; the intention here is only to show how the components are related to each other. One component of uncertainty is irreducible uncertainty, as shown in Figure 1 (b). This uncertainty commonly comes in the form of a random process, and other authors use terms such as variability or aleatory uncertainty [15] [16] [17] to describe similar aspects of uncertainty. The actual existence of such irreducible uncertainty is a philosophical issue about which many people disagree. For example, people disagree about whether any process is truly random, with some claiming that if the process were fully understood, it would no longer appear random. Such Aughenbaugh philosophical arguments about the existence of irreducible uncertainty are tangential to our main point. Most authors [15] [16] [17] , including skeptics of a fundamental distinction between types of uncertainty [18] , are willing to admit that it is useful in practice to accept that some uncertainties, such as machining errors, are the result of truly random processes. In a sense, engineers are building a model of the uncertainty. Even if the process is not random at the level of fundamental physics, engineers may choose to assume it is for practical reasons, much as they make other assumptions and simplifications when modeling real systems.
Irreducible uncertainty accounts for the gap between certainty and a state of precise information, defined as the state of having acquired all information about a particular model of irreducible uncertainty available at any price. Clearly, different assumptions could be made about the irreducible uncertainty, but we focus on how well the irreducible uncertainty is characterized.
For example, even if a quantity is assumed to be random, the type of the distribution (e.g. normal) and its parameters (e.g. mean and variance) still need to be determined. If the distribution type and parameters are known perfectly, then the irreducible uncertainty is known precisely.
The gap between the present state of information and a state of precise information about the irreducible uncertainty, shown in Figure 1 (b), is defined as imprecision. Other authors use terms such as epistemic uncertainty, ignorance, or reducible uncertainty [15] [16] [17] to describe similar aspects of uncertainty. We specifically avoid the terms aleatory and epistemic because they have been used primarily in an attempt to differentiate the inherent nature of different uncertainties, rather than focusing on how human decision-makers should manage uncertainty in engineering design. Previous work has examined imprecision in preferences [19] and pure interval data [20] , while other work has examined the use of possibility theory to capture uncertainty in design [21, 22] . Aughenbaugh Decision theory has long differentiated between the decision-making with known probabilities (decision-making under risk) and decision-making without knowledge of probabilities (decisionmaking under uncertainty) [23] . Since then, researchers have explored the middle ground of incomplete knowledge of probabilities [24] , such as ordered probabilities [25] and linear constraints on the probabilities [26] . Other literature has examined incomplete or partial information (see [27] for a review) in the context of imprecisely characterized preferences [28] [29] [30] and unknown weights in multi-attribute decision-making [31] .
These methods all share the goal of formalizing decision-making with partial information, and most result in intervals of expected utility that must be resolved using additional decision rules.
In this paper, we focus on partial information about probabilities-specifically, imprecise probabilities-in the context of engineering design and risk. Imprecise probabilities are a generalization of the notion of probability with roots back to Keynes, who first suggested that a single number is not sufficient to characterize probability [32] . Since Keynes, many researchers have presented theories of uncertainty that start with the notion that probabilities in general can only be bounded by upper and lower (or imprecise) probabilities [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] or sets of probabilities [38] [39] [40] . These generalizations of probability theory are more broadly applicable than theories of ordered probabilities. In the following sections, we motivate the representation of uncertainty in engineering design using imprecise probabilities, as suggested and formalized by Walley [36] .
We begin with a discussion of interpretations of probability.
Interpretations of probability
Most engineers are familiar with the mathematics of probability, but many have not been formally exposed to the competing interpretations of probability. The philosophical arguments for or against different interpretations can be quite passionate. The interpretations most commonly adopted in engineering design are variations of the frequentist and subjective Aughenbaugh interpretations [41] . We briefly introduce both and indicate how imprecise probabilities are relevant under either interpretation. For more complete discussions of interpretations of probability, see for example [36, [41] [42] [43] [44] .
The frequentist interpretation is based on the notion of relative frequencies of outcomes. Under a frequentist interpretation, a probability represents the ratio of times that one outcome occurs compared to the total number of outcomes in a series of identical, repeatable, and possibly random trials. In engineering design, events are not always repeatable. Even assuming some events are essentially repeatable and data can be collected, there is no guarantee that a particular sample is representative of the true relative frequency. Although in theory the relative sample frequency approaches the true relative frequency as the sample size goes to infinity, an infinite sample size is impossible to acquire in practice. Consequently, engineers will always face imprecision in their characterizations of the frequentist probabilities.
Proponents of a subjective interpretation of probability assert that there is no such thing as a true or objective probability, but rather probabilities are an expression of belief based on an individual's willingness to bet [18, 42, 45] . One of the subjectivists' primary arguments against a frequentist perspective is the absence of truly repeatable events, especially in practical problems. For example, the probability that Team A beats Team B in a basketball game has no real meaning under a frequentist interpretation, because that event-that particular game-will occur exactly once. In this context, the notion of a long term frequency, and even random events, is meaningless [42] . However, many people are willing to express their belief of who will win in terms of bets. When framed appropriately, such bets can be taken as subjective probabilities.
The process of eliciting and assessing an individual's beliefs, or willingness to bet, is resource intensive. Even assuming that precise beliefs-and hence precise probabilities-exist, it will often be impractical to fully characterize them due to constraints such as bounded rationality, time, and computational ability [27, 36, 46] . Consequently, only a partial-and therefore imprecise-characterization of subjective probabilities is normally available. We address additional motivations for the use of imprecise probabilities in the next section.
We prefer to adopt a loosely subjective interpretation of probability because true relative frequencies cannot be determined with any finite number of data samples, and because a subjective interpretation is applicable to a broader class of problems, as it is not limited to repeatable events. Our interpretation is not as strict as the traditional views (see Lindley [45] for a summary of the strict subjective tradition), because we admit imprecisely known subjective probabilities. The traditional school claims that by definition, subjective probabilities are known to a decision-maker, because they are his or her beliefs. We prefer an interpretation that acknowledges the practical difficulties [27, 36, 46] in arriving at a precise characterization of such beliefs. Naturally, subjective probabilities should be consistent with available information, including knowledge about observed relative frequencies and the DM's actual beliefs; such probabilities can be considered rationalist subjective probabilities [36] .
The motivation for imprecise probabilities
The general motivation for imprecise probabilities is that the more evidence on which a probability estimate is based, the more confidence a decision-maker can have in it. Thus, the imprecision in the probabilities should be expressed explicitly in order to signal the appropriate level of confidence to ascribe to them.
Adapting an example from Walley [36] , consider the toss of a thumbtack. The goal of an exercise is to determine the probability that the tack lands pin-up. Three experimenters perform this exercise, as follows: Aughenbaugh -Experimenter A is in a hurry and does not even look at the thumbtack. Experimenter A employs a non-informative prior distribution, in this case using principle of indifference or insufficient reason [32] , and assumes that the probability of the tack landing pin-up is equal to the probability it lands pin-down, thus ascribing a probability of 0.5 to both outcomes.
-Experimenter B tosses the thumbtack 10 times and gets 6 pin-ups. Experimenter B's estimated precise probability of the tack landing pin-up is thus 0.6.
-Experimenter C tosses the thumbtack 1000 times and gets 400 pin-ups. Experimenter C's estimated precise probability of the tack landing pin-up is thus 0.4.
If we think of the three experimenters as three analysts that could provide us with information, which analyst would we prefer to hire? Because Experimenter C's estimate was based on more data, it is more precise than Experimenter B's estimate. Experimenter A's estimate was based on no data, so it does not seem reasonable to place much confidence in it. Nevertheless, the precise probability estimates of 0.5, 0.6, and 0.4 appear equally credible. By not expressing the imprecision in these estimates, one is arbitrarily eliminating it by assuming precision that has no justification in the available evidence. This problem can be overcome by allowing analysts to state imprecise probabilities.
A full discussion of Walley's formalization of imprecise probabilities [36] is well outside the scope of this paper, but we summarize a few essentials. Walley defines upper and lower probabilities, which are special cases of upper and lower previsions [47] . In simple terms, the lower prevision is a price at which a decision-maker (DM) is sure he or she would buy a bet, and the upper prevision is a price at which the DM is sure he or she would buy the opposite of the bet (which is equivalent to selling the original bet). Previsions are equivalent to probabilities if the stakes of the bet are one unit of currency, such as one dollar. If the upper and lower previsions Aughenbaugh are equal, then they jointly represent the DM's fair price for the bet, the price at which the DM is willing to take either side of the bet. At a price between the upper and lower previsions, the DM is not willing to enter the bet on either side, at least not without collecting more information and updating his or her previsions.
One possible objection to the use of imprecise probabilities is that they can lead to such indeterminacy of action during decision-making. That is, given imprecise probabilities, there may not be a single, clear "best" solution according to standard decision theories. We counter this by arguing that if the available evidence does not clearly suggest a particular course of action, then the representation of this evidence should not arbitrarily pretend that it does. An approach that demands precise probabilities necessitates an arbitrary resolution of the indeterminacy.
Such an approach does not differentiate well-grounded probabilities (such as Experimenter C's in the tack-tossing example) from arbitrary ones (such as Experimenter A's). By admitting imprecise probabilities, one can abstain from these arbitrary judgments during analysis and support better decision-making, as follows.
It is true that in order for a single solution to be chosen, any indeterminacy will need to be resolved. However, the explicit representation of imprecision in the characterization of uncertainty allows for the direct management of the imprecision in the context of a decision. For example, if a decision is not sensitive to the current level of imprecision, a robust decision can be made using rules such as arbitrary choice [36] , Γ-maximin [48] , or the Hurwicz criterion [49] .
On the other hand, if the decision is sensitive to the existing imprecision, one can decide to collect more information (such as more tack tosses in the earlier example), perhaps managing the set of alternatives according to policies of E-admissibility [39] or maximality [36] . Aughenbaugh Another frequently levied-but invalid-objection to imprecise probabilities is the Dutch Book Argument that they are irrational [36, 42, 50] . The general idea of a Dutch Book is that if a DM's probabilities violate certain rules, a group of bets can be constructed, all of which the DM is willing to accept, but the combination of which results in a sure loss; the DM will lose money under any outcome. This argument is often presented in favor of precise probabilities and the axioms of Kolmorogov [51] . However, Walley [36] presents axioms of coherence for imprecise probabilities that also avoid sure loss.
Once again, the details of Walley's formalization of imprecise probabilities are beyond the scope of this paper, but he begins with the same fundamental notion of rationality as de Finetti [42, 47] -avoidance of a sure loss. His axioms of coherence assure that if a DM's imprecise probabilities satisfy them, then the DM is not subject to a sure loss. His primary deviation from axioms of precise probabilities such as de Finetti's is the allowance for a range of indeterminacy-prices at which the DM will not enter a bet as either a buyer or a seller. Thus, if a DM's imprecise probabilities are coherent, he or she will not enter into a situation in which he or she suffers a sure loss. If a DM spends the time and effort to collect complete evidence and fully elicit his or her beliefs, then the imprecise probabilities will collapse into precise probabilities.
The only concrete way to determine the value of using imprecise probabilities in engineering design is in the context of decision theory. Informally, one method of representing uncertainty is better than another if it allows designers to make better decisions. With this in mind, we discuss decision theory in the following section. Aughenbaugh
DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Engineering design decisions are hampered by the uncertainty inherent in predicting the outcomes, payoffs, and risks of different actions. In this section, we discuss a safety-factor approach to design, probabilistic risk assessment, and traditional statistical decision theory.
Design with safety factors
It may be that due to complex interactions in a system or due to a lack of valid data, engineers cannot characterize risk very well. One way engineers strive to reduce risk is by over-designing the product by a safety factor. In this sense, a safety factor is an attempt to wrap all uncertainty into one number. The simplicity of employing safety factors is its biggest advantage, but the unanswered question in this approach is how large of a safety factor is necessary to meet risk, reliability, and performance requirements given the existing uncertainty? In the presence of large data histories, safety factors can be linked to probabilistic characterizations of uncertainty and reliability [1] . However, this link assumes precise probabilities are available.
In practice, particularly for novel design tasks, engineers do not have precise probabilities and often must resort to an ad hoc choice of a safety factor. Because engineers do not want structures to fail, they usually choose safety factors that are much larger than necessary. This frequently results in costly over-design of the product. At the same time, the ad hoc method fails to provide any guarantee of reliability. Consequently, engineers have pursued more formal methods for dealing with uncertainty, such as probabilistic risk assessment and traditional statistical decision theory.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Since the 1970s, one widely used approach to quantitative risk assessment has been probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) [13] . PRA, while serving somewhat as an umbrella term, is essentially a Aughenbaugh process for assessing risk in a rigorous and quantitative manner. PRA involves identifying scenarios, consequences, and probabilities. It is clear that poor decisions may result from a PRA if the numbers used in the quantification of risk are incorrect. However, the most important time to use PRA is when there is little data available on which to base estimates of probabilities [13] .
PRA deals with this imprecision by beginning the characterization of probabilities with prior distributions and updating these priors according to Bayes' rule as evidence is collected. We believe there are several problems with this approach, including both with interpretation and application. First, the probability distributions that result from this approach attempt to characterize uncertainty from both randomness and imprecision. This inherently confounds two different aspects of the problem, and therefore makes it difficult to draw useful insights from the resultant distributions [52] . Conversely, a method based on imprecise probabilities presents a quantitative way to handle imprecision independently from randomness. Second, there is no general agreement on the selection of priors [36] . The choice of the prior distribution, especially the statistical variance that is supposed to act as a proxy for imprecision, is a very qualitative act.
Traditional Statistical Decision Theory
In traditional statistical decision theory [53] , utility analysis, as originally proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern [54] , is used for making decisions under uncertainty. In general, utility expresses preference-more preferred decision outcomes are assigned higher utility values.
Utility theory has been studied extensively by economists and decision theorists, and there continues to be an increasing interest in applying utility methods to engineering problems, as in [2] [3] [4] [5] . If chosen correctly, utilities reflect the decision-maker's preferences, even under uncertainty. By applying the expected value operator, the decision-maker weights all possible outcomes according to their likelihood of occurring, and then chooses the action that maximizes the expected utility.
In order to calculate expectations, common practice in traditional statistical decision theory is to characterize uncertainty with a precise probability density function. In order to use this representation, a designer is forced to either eliminate imprecision or ignore it. Eliminating imprecision requires the designer to expend resources to acquire more information, thus increasing the costs of the design process. Ignoring imprecision involves overstating the true current state of information by making assumptions. This is equivalent to forcing a decisionmaker to make an exact statement or choice, even if he or she has not yet reached an exact belief of judgment [27] . Since both of these approaches have inherent problems, it appears that an extension to existing statistical decision theory is needed. In the following sections of this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that by generalizing the statistical formalism to allow imprecise probabilities, better decisions can be obtained.
PROBABILITY BOUNDS ANALYSIS
Some alternatives to precise probabilities, such as fuzzy sets [6, 55] , possibility theory [21, 22, 56] , fuzzy measures [57] , the transferable belief model [58] , and the some interpretations of Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory (see [59] for a discussion of interpretations), abandon the notion of probability entirely. This opens them up to significant criticism, at least in part due to their unfamiliarity to practicing engineers and their lack of a clear behavioral interpretation [60] .
Imprecise probabilities, on the other hand, are an extension of traditional probability theory and therefore have a clear behavioral interpretation.
There are many ways to compute with imprecise probabilities, including second-order [61] or joint Monte Carlo sampling [62] . However, these methods are computationally expensive. In order to consider imprecision explicitly and distinctly from irreducible uncertainty, we use a recently developed formalism that extends traditional probability theory and incorporates imprecise probabilities-called probability boxes, or p-boxes [63] . A p-box is a slightly Aughenbaugh simplified representation of imprecise probabilities that allows for much more flexible and efficient computations, as described in the Discussion and Future Work section. The analysis of uncertainty that is represented in a p-box is called probability bounds analysis, or PBA.
PBA basics
A p-box is a more expressive generalization of both traditional probability distributions and interval representations, as is illustrated in Figure 2 . The p-box incorporates both imprecision and probabilistic characterizations by expressing interval bounds on the cumulative probability distribution function (CDF) for a random variable. A general p-box explicitly expresses both probability (represented by the shapes of the boundary CDFs) and imprecision (represented by the separation between the upper and lower bounds). More formally, the bounds on a p-box, such as shown in Figure 3 
Constructing p-boxes
There are several ways to construct p-boxes [64, 65] , depending on the type of information available. In this paper, we construct p-boxes based on 95% confidence intervals on the parameters of a known distribution type, as described in [66] . While the distribution type will not always be known, in engineering applications it is common that some theoretical knowledge can guide the selection of a distribution type [67] . However, such knowledge is not a requirement for using PBA. Probability boxes also can be constructed based on distribution-free methods that just use statistical data or moments. An engineer could also assume different types of distribution, construct p-boxes for each, and then take the envelope of all of these to form the most general p-box.
In general, there is no rule for selecting the confidence level at which to construct a p-box.
However, a confidence level has a clear interpretation; if something, such as confidence interval on a point estimate, is constructed at the 95% confidence level, it means that if the experiment were repeated many times and a 95% confidence interval constructed for each repetition, then 95% of those intervals contain the true value. An individual designer must understand the consequences of confidence levels and choose one that is appropriate for the problem and preferences at hand. 
Interpreting a p-box
For illustration, it is easiest to consider a p-box as constructed at the 100% confidence level, though in any practical problem such a p-box would be infinite. In this case, the p-box expresses the range of all CDFs that are still deemed possible based on existing information. For example, assume that for all practical purposes, X is a random variable, and engineers have strong theoretical information that X is normally distributed with known variance 2 =1
σ . However, the engineers can only characterize the mean imprecisely, bounding it in the interval µ=[0,1] .
Extending the notation of probability, we can write
such that X is distributed normally with mean µ and variance 2 σ . The corresponding p-box is shown in Figure 3(a) . In this case, the bounds on the p-box are defined by the two distributions, However, any distribution that falls partially or entirely outside of the p-box is inconsistent with the present state of information. Aughenbaugh
Vertical slices of the p-box yield intervals on the CDF for a particular realization. For example, a vertical slice at zero yields the interval for the CDF of [0.1587, 0.5]. This means that the probability that X is less than zero is between 0.1587 and 0.5, but one does not have enough information to specify a precise probability within that interval. Horizontal slices of a p-box result in intervals on the quantiles of the CDF. For example, a slice at the median (CDF=0.5)
gives the interval [0,1] for the median.
MEASURING THE VALUE OF USING IMPRECISE PROBABILITIES
In this section, we use as an example two approaches for designing a pressure vessel under incomplete information to demonstrate the value of imprecise probabilities. Descriptions of the design scenario and the computational experiment follow.
Design scenario
Assume one needs to design a pressure vessel that is to contain 0.15 m 3 of gas under 7 MPa of pressure. Due to space limitations, certain maximum dimensions are imposed. The goal is to determine the dimensions (radius R, wall thickness t, and length L) of the vessel, shown in Figure   4 , for which the overall utility, defined in Equation (2) Because the material is new and testing is relatively expensive, variations in yield strength have only been measured in a set Σ of n independent tension tests, where n is a relatively small number due cost considerations. These tests can at best give an estimate of the true distribution, so in addition to inherent randomness (irreducible uncertainty), engineers also face imprecision-they cannot characterize the parameters of the random variable precisely. The number of samples n can be varied to explore different levels of imprecision, just as the number of tosses was varied in the thumbtack example.
Since the vessel will be used in a human-occupied location, the consequences of failure are significant. Designers account for the risk associated with vessel failure explicitly in a utility function based on payoff in dollars and shown in Equation (2). 
The explicit inclusion of risk is seen more obviously if we consider the expected utility:
= consequences * probability of failure risk 
This formulation allows us to recognize that risk, and more specifically the pressure vessel's probability of failure (meaning the probability that the yield strength is less than the maximum stress in the walls of the pressure vessel), plays a very important part in design decisions. It thus seems important to characterize these probabilities appropriately.
The computational experiment
The goal of the computational experiment is to compare the utility of the design solutions that result when different approaches for representing uncertainty are applied to the same design problem. The comparison is made possible in this experiment because we assume that overseeing the experiment is a supervisor who is in a state of precise information about the steel's material properties. From the supervisor's perspective, only irreducible uncertainty exists-uncertainty about the yield strength of the material that is precisely characterized by a normal distribution with a mean of 180 MPa and a standard deviation of 15 MPa. The supervisor can therefore determine precisely the dimensions of the pressure vessel that result in the maximum expected utility. This optimal design under the precise information is the benchmark for comparison of the other design approaches.
The general layout of the experiment is shown in Figure 5 . The experiment consists of two designers: one using a single best-fit normal distribution (approach A), and the other (approach B) using a p-box to represent the uncertainty about the yield strength. The details of these approaches are explained in the sections following this general overview of the experiment. 
In order to compare the value of the two approaches, the supervisor, who has access to precise information, computes the difference in expected utility. Using the fact that the two approaches start with the same information (sample Σ), the value of approach B over approach A can then be expressed as
It is necessary to note that this value was for only one particular Σ-the set of yield strength measurements with which both designers start. Due to the randomness in Σ, one trial is not sufficient to judge the relative value of each approach; the supervisor needs to repeat the above experiment many times in order to determine which design approach performs best on average, over m different sample sets Σ. Mathematically, the expectation must be taken with respect to Σ in order to calculate the average expected value of approach B over A, written
The addition of the word average emphasizes that this quantity is the expectation over the samples of the expected utility of particular design solutions.
In this section, we presented a method for comparing design approaches. The approaches that we compare are described in the following section. Aughenbaugh
Design using approach A: precise normal fit
Designer A does not have access to precise information, but instead only has access to the set Σ of n data samples. Because the designer does not know the true distribution of y σ , he or she must make an approximation, denoted ( , ) y A σ Σ . In this approximation, the representation of y σ depends on both the approach, in this case A, and the observed random sample Σ. Designer A represents the uncertainty as a normal distribution, using the sample mean and sample variance as unbiased estimates of the true mean and true variance, respectively. This yields the probabilistic model Σ is expressed as a p-box rather than a pure normal distribution. The p-box is Aughenbaugh constructed using 95% confidence intervals on the mean and variance of the yield strength [68] 
Written in terms of mean and standard deviation, these two intervals form four extreme combinations, such as shown in Figure 6 . These four distributions form the boundaries of the pbox shown in Figure 7 . All normal distributions with means and variances given by Equations (14) and (15) are contained inside this p-box. 
where:
is the designer's chosen design action given sample set Σ. Because the p-box expresses a range of possible distributions, the expected utility is no longer a crisp number but rather an interval defined by lower-bound E and upper-bound E , such that
This interval can be found by a variety of methods [69] [70] [71] . The conceptually simplest (but mathematically complex) is to try all distributions that are inside the p-box, since they all correspond to a point in the interval. More practically, the p-box could be discretized into a very large number of distributions that are representative of the types of distributions and parameters.
The expected utility for each of these could be created, and then all the points aggregated into an approximate interval. In this example problem, the bounds on the expected utility interval result from the distributions bounding the p-box due to the monotonicity of the utility function with respect to the uncertain parameter, and thus the calculations were straightforward. For a more complex problem, the computations could be more involved, as described in the Discussion and Future Work section.
Because the expected utility is now an interval, the designer cannot choose design variables b Σ that maximize the expected utility in the traditional sense. Instead, a new decision rule is required. While other approaches exist as discussed in the Discussion and Future Work section, in this experiment a conservative best-worst case, or Γ-maximin [48] is used. Designer B therefore chooses the design action b Σ that has the highest lower bound E on the expected utility.
This results in an optimal design decision using approach B given the observed samples Σ, 
Aughenbaugh
Supervisor's design under precise information
In addition to approach A and approach B, the experiment's supervisor can create a design using the true distribution, since he or she is in a state of precise information. Figure 5 ), the supervisor then chooses the design variables
such that the expected utility E [ ( , )]
is maximized. This leads to the optimal design under precise information:
This optimal design, with expected utility denoted * E[ ( )] U k for brevity, serves as the baseline for comparison because no other approach can yield an average higher expected utility across many repetitions m.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The computational experiment was repeated for many different initial sample set sizes, that is many different n . For each level of n , the design process was repeated for 100, 000 m = different initial sample sets Σ in order to determine the average performance of the two methods.
We first present the results for the particular sample size 25 n = , and then discuss the results over varying values of n , which represent different levels of imprecision.
Value of using imprecise probabilities for n=25 samples of the true yield strength
We first conduct the experiment with a sample set Σ of size 25 n = , meaning the designers are given the results of 25 independent yield stress tests. As measured by the supervisor using precise information and averaged over 100, 000 m = initial sets, approach B on average yields designs with greater expected utility than approach A. Specifically, using standard statistical analysis, we find the 95% confidence interval (CI) on the value of approach B over A to be:
To put this result in perspective, the expected utility of the supervisor's design, which is the best possible because it is designed under a state of precise information, is
Thus the CI on the expected value of approach B over A can also be expressed as [21%, 25%] of the optimal utility * E[ ( )] U k . This is a substantial deviation that suggests that there is value in using the p-box approach for this design problem. We also note the average expected utilities realized under approach A and B, recalling that larger utility, like larger profit, is more desirable: The total deviations from optimal ($70 for approach A and $46 for approach B), coupled with the relative value of approach B over A, indicate that B is a better approach at this level of imprecision. In the next section, we explore how these results differ at varying levels of imprecision.
Variation of value with level of imprecision
The previous discussion dealt with a fixed sample set size of 25 n = material strength tests.
While those results demonstrated that it was valuable to use the p-box approach in that case, a more general result is desirable. By varying the number of material strength tests n , we can vary the imprecision of the characterization. The supervisor's design yields the best possible Aughenbaugh expected utility * E[ ( )] U k , and hence the designs of designers A and B can at best equal it. In Figure 8 , we plot (in log-log scale) the percent deviation from this best-possible expected utility for approach A and approach B for different values of n . Because this is a deviation from bestpossible, the smallest absolute value is desirable. Hence, hence examining Figure 8 , smaller is better. For example, for a sample size of 100, the 95% CI on the value of approach B is [-5.5%,
In summary, as the imprecision increases, the value of approach B over approach A increases significantly. As the imprecision approaches zero, approach A becomes only slightly better than B. For different design problems, the designer will not necessarily know where the two curves cross. Thus, unless the designer is sure a priori that the consequences of the imprecision are insignificant, the results of this computational experiment suggest that it is valuable to explicitly Aughenbaugh represent the imprecision in the available characterization of uncertainties by using imprecise probabilities.
Explanation of results
In this section, we provide some insight into the results of the previous two sections. The results for 100,000 different sample sets Σ of sizes n=10, 25, and 100 are shown in histograms in Figure   9 . The x-axis of the histogram in Figure 9 is the expected value of approach B over A, denoted In many cases, approach B yields a design with a lower utility than approach A due to the extra material costs of the more conservative design. However, in some cases, approach B yields a design with a much higher expected utility. The tails of the distribution for 10 n = and 25 n = extend much farther to the right than shown in the figure. For example, the maximum expected value of approach B over A seen in any trial of 10 n = was $220,000. Results such as these skew the overall distribution such that on average, approach B yields a design with a higher expected utility than approach A yields. As the imprecision decreases, both the skewness of the distribution and the value of approach B over A decrease. Aughenbaugh
The results can also be understood in terms of the expected utility curves used in the experiment.
In Figure 10 and Figure 11 , we illustrate the expected utility as a function of wall thickness t for two different samples, Σ 1 and Σ 2 respectively, both of size 25 In Figure 11 (based on sample set Σ 2 ), the true curve is near the lower bound of approach B. For this particular sample set Σ 2 , the expected utility from approach B is about $70 more than that from approach A, so the relative value of approach B for sample Σ 2 is V(B)=$70. 
V(B)>0
The preceding results are for two representative cases. The overall results of the experiment, discussed previously, indicate that, on average, the latter case dominates. Approach A is more likely to overestimate the true material strength, and when it does, the consequences are disastrous -a high probability of failure. Approach B is more conservative, resulting in higher costs, but, on average, these material costs are offset by the reduced failure costs. As the sample size increases, the best-fit normal distribution of approach A becomes, on average, closer to the true distribution, such as the example sample Σ 3 shown in Figure 12 . For this sample, the optimal designs of the three approaches converge, and therefore yield similar utilities.
Thus we can see that when the imprecision is small, the value of approach B over A is near zero.
Summary of results
For this design problem, the experimental results indicate that when the imprecision is large, approach B (using imprecise probabilities) performs significantly better than approach A (using precise probabilities). When the imprecision is small, the difference between the two approaches is insignificant. This computational experiment has therefore demonstrated that there are scenarios in which it is valuable to explicitly represent the imprecision in the available characterization of uncertainties by using imprecise probabilities.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we present a specific and simplified design problem and computational experiment that demonstrates the value of using imprecise probabilities in engineering design. There are other issues to consider, such as computation cost and decision policies. Additionally, it is always useful to explore the results in more general problems.
Computational costs
In this paper, we have demonstrated the potential value of a design method that uses imprecise probabilities. What we have heretofore referred to as value is really the gross value or benefit.
According to the principles of information economics [68] , designers should really care about the gain, or net value, which is defined as the difference between gross value (benefit) and cost, including computational cost.
In this example, the computational costs were small due to the structure of the problem. In reality, even the best-fit probabilistic approach often will require Monte Carlo analysis or related methods in order to calculate expected values [72] . These methods have an inherently high computational cost, even when used in combination with surrogate modeling [73, 74] to reduce the computational burden. An obvious way to compute with p-boxes is to perform a secondorder Monte Carlo simulation, in which an outer loop is added around the traditional loop [61] .
Such methods can be extremely expensive in terms of computations. However, PBA can be performed using algorithms with foundations in interval analysis that do not require second order Monte Carlo techniques [70, 71] . Ferson and Ginzburg [15] show that these methods are on average much less computationally expensive than second order Monte Carlo methods.
An added benefit is the flexibility of these algorithms. In Monte Carlo analysis, engineers often assume specific dependencies between variables as a matter of convenience that enables the use of standard statistics. This may understate the true imprecision in the available characterizations of uncertainty and may have serious consequences. PBA provides methods [65] that can propagate uncertainty under various conditions of dependence and correlation, including the extremes of fully known and completely unknown dependencies.
Despite this promise, the application of these techniques has yet to be explored in complex engineering design problems. It is therefore unclear how well PBA can propagate uncertainty from many sources, or how well PBA can be integrated with more complex design tools and models, such as discrete-event simulations and optimization methods. These issues need to be resolved before PBA can be put to use in general engineering design problems. Aughenbaugh
Decision policies and preferences
In this experiment, the relatively high consequences of vessel failure, in comparison to material costs, makes failure avoidance a key driver in the design. The Γ-maximin decision policy used in this experiment is conservative compared to a normal fit approach. Because it uses the lower bound on the expected utility, it is actually the most conservative policy that is consistent with the available evidence. Other decision policies (such as maximality [36] , Γ-maximin [48] , Eadmissibility [39] , or the Hurwicz criterion [49] ) are both possible and rational, and may perform better in different circumstances. If instead of the lower bound on expected utility we use the midpoint between the upper and lower bounds (a Hurwicz policy with criterion of 0.5 [49] ), the results change. For example, the two curves in Figure 13 cross at 45 samples, as compared to 40 in Figure 8 with the Γ-maximin policy.
By using imprecise probabilities, the designer's preferences are a factor in the resolution of imprecision, whereas a best-fit approach ignores the nature of the decision-maker's preferences when arbitrarily assuming precision when modeling the uncertainty, rather than the decision.
When the utility function is skewed due to a high cost of consequences in the risk term, such as in this example, the maximum of the midpoint of the expected utility bounds is much closer to the maximum of the lower bound than to the maximum of the best-fit solution, as shown in Figure 14 . In short, by explicitly accounting for imprecision, a more appropriate and quantitative performance/risk tradeoff can be performed.
An obvious question is: why is the midpoint solution not similar to the best-fit solution?
The answer highlights an important advantage of a p-box approach over a best-fit approach. The midpoint is applied to the expected utility distributions, whereas the best-fit is done on the parameters of the uncertainty model. In general, the best-fit approach leaves the decision-maker Aughenbaugh to deal with imprecision qualitatively and outside the uncertainty formalism, while the p-box approach quantifies the imprecision explicitly in utility curves. 
SUMMARY
Although engineers inherently lack information during the engineering design process and therefore face uncertainty and risks, existing design methods do not explicitly represent the imprecision in the available characterizations of uncertainty. The pressure vessel design example in this paper demonstrates that when the designers only have access to a small set of sample data, a design approach that uses imprecise probabilities to model uncertainty in design decisions leads on average to better designs than a purely probabilistic approach that requires precise probabilities. We can then conclude that in some design problems, it is valuable to represent the imprecision in the available characterization of uncertainties explicitly by using imprecise probabilities. 
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